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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL WARD CLEMENTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12400 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Clements appeals from a conviction of second degree 
burglary in the District Court of the Second Judicial Dis-
trict in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Hon-
orable Calvin Gould, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Calvin Gould, judge, sitting without 
a jury, found Clements guilty of second degree burglary 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (1969 Supp.) and 
sentenced him to not less than one nor more than twenty 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Clements appeals from that conviction and sentenc-
mg. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
State seeks affinnance of the judgment of the lower 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Clements and another were caught inside the Ogden 
Clinic late at night on April 18, 1970. After first being 
confronted by a police officer, Clements and his friend 
ran dovm a corridor and were both later found hiding in 
the building (R. 42-43, 62-63). Where Clements was 
found to be hiding there was also found a loaded .357 
l\fa_gnum lying under .1 piece of foam (R. 49). Another 
gun was also found in Clements' car (R. 70-73). 
Testimony in the trial court showed that Clements 
and his friend had not been authorized to enter the clinic 
(R. 40, 68). There was also testimony indicating that at 
about 5: 30 p.m. on April 18, 1970 all of the windows and 
doors were shut and secured (R. 66). Officers testified 
that two screwdrivers were found on the floor in the front 
of the building and that a window had been broken in-
ward in the building (R. 64, 69-70). A police officer testi-
fied that he saw Clements and his friend trying to unlock 
or pry open an inside door (R. 43) . 
Clements was charged with second degree burglary 
and an habitual crimin~l violation in two separate cases. 
These cases were consolidated for the same trial (R. 18). 
Because Clements and his friend were both charged on 
second degree burglary dealing with the same factual situ-
ation, Judge John F. Wahlquist suggested that the two 
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defendants might be tncd together if the State would filP 
the proper motion for consolidation (R. 18). 
On June 29, 1970 a motion for consolidation was filed 
by the State and on October 5, 1970 before Judge Ronald 
0. Hyde the cases of the two defendants were consolidated 
for trial and the habitual cri.>ninal charges were dismissed 
(R. 26). 
The trial took place on November 10, 1970 wherein 
the transcript shows that the Honorable Calvin Gould, 
Judge reviewed the consolidation matters with the defen-
dants' attorneys (R. 37). Judge Gould also interrogated 
the defendant regarding his waiver of a jury trial (R. 36-
37). The trial proceeded as a consolidated trial before the 
Honorable Calvin Gould sitting without a jury. The de-
fendants were both founn guilty of second degree burglary 
and sentenced to prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SHOW THAT CLEMENTS HAD THE NEC-
ESSARY INTENT TO SUSTAIN THE CON-
V I C T I 0 N OF SECOND DEGREE BUR-
GLARY. 
Clements contends that the evidence presented in the 
trial court was insufficient to show that the defendant had 
the requisite specific intent to commit the crime of bur-
glary in the second degree. This offense, as outlined by 
the Utah Code, has a specified intent: 
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"Every person who forcibly breaks and enters, 
or without force enters an open door, window or 
other aperture, of any house, room, apartment, 
tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, 
outhouse, or other building, or any tent, sheep or 
cattle camp, vessel, watercraft, railroad car, auto-
mobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or aircraft 
with intent to commit larceny or any felony, is 
guilty of burglary in the second degree." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (1969 Supp.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
It should be noted that proof of the commission of 
a larceny or a felony is not required by the statute but 
rather that the defendant's intention to commit a larceny 
or felony be shown. Because the true intent of the indi-
vidual may only be known by himself, the proof of specific 
intent in criminal matters can only be shown through 
circumstantial evidence. The Utah cases dealing with tbt! 
required standard of proof in second degree burglary cases 
clearly point this out. 
In the case of State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 324 P. 
2d 490 (1958), the defendant contended that as a matter 
of law there was insufficient evidence to directly prove 
that he had the requisite intent for the crime of burglary. 
Defendant has been apprehended coming out of a foundry. 
The foundry had been locked and the defendant had not 
been authorized to make entry. Evidence showed that a 
window in the foundry had been broken and that locks 
on a door had been tampered with. Nothing was found 
to have been stolen from the foundry and the defendant 
had been drinking but was not drunk according to any 
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visible signs. This court said in relationship to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence and proof of intent: 
"Nor can it be said as a matter of law that 
from all the facts and circumstances in this case a 
jury could not reasonably find beyond a reason-
able doubt the necessary intent to commit larceny 
or any other felony. No attempt was made to ex-
plain appellant's breaking and entering the foun-
dry in the nighttime, nor does there appear any 
lawful motive for such entry. Under such circum-
stances a reasonable inference from the evidence 
is that the entry was made for the purpose of com-
mitting larceny or some other felony. Intent is 
usually proved by acts and conduct. (citation 
omitted)." State v. Tellay, 7 Utah 2d 308, 309, 
324 P. 2d 490, 491 (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
The court held in circumstances very similar to the 
case presently before the court that the reasonable in-
ference from finding an individual having broken into a 
building that he has not been authorized to enter is that 
he has entered the building with the purpose of commit-
ting larceny or a felony. 
Clements, in the case before us, was found inside a 
building that he had not been authorized to enter. The 
building had been locked and secured the previous even-
ing. A window was found broken by which it was assumed 
Clements and his friend obtained access. The defendants 
were seen trying to pry open an inner door and when con-
fronted by the police officer, fled to another pa1't of the 
building. Clements was found hiding in a utility closet 
and where he was hiding a gun was also found. 
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It is the State's contention that under these circum-
stances " ... [A] reasonable inference from the evidence 
is that entry was made for the purpose of committing 
larceny or some other felony." Id. 
Another case directly in point is State v. Hopkins, 
11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P. 2d 486 (1961). This was another 
case where the <lefendant contended that there was no 
direct proof of his intent to commit larceny and that the 
proof of intent was made entirely on the basis of circum-
stantial evidence. The defendant in Hopkins fled the 
scene and was later apprehended. At first he claimed no 
connection with the offense but later admitted being in 
the dwelling of another. Hopkins offered an explanation 
of his presence in the apartment but his testimony was 
evidently not believed as the jury found him guilty. This 
court in affirming the conviction stated: 
"It is to be remembered that intent, being a 
state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof. 
But it can be inferred from conduct and attendant 
circumstances in the light of human behavior and 
experience. It is upon that basis that authorities 
uniformly affirm that where one breaks and enters 
into the dwelling of another in the nighttime, with-
out the latter's consent, an inference may be drawn 
that he did so to commit larceny. This, coupled 
with defendant's other inculpatory conduct de-
scribed above, including his flight from the scene, 
which itself may be regarded as some evidence of 
guilt, provide ample proof to support the verdict." 
State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 365, 359 P. 2d 
486, 487 (1961). 
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This court's position in respect to the presumption 
of intent to commit larceny when found in the building 
of another without consent was reaffirmed. In the case 
at bar, as in the Hopkins case, the defendant fled the 
scene which operates as further circumstantial evidence 
of guilt. 
Under these standards for the proof of intent to com-
mit larceny or a felony the judge properly ruled that there 
was sufficient evidence to establish guilt. Because the 
judge was sitting without a jury it was his duty to apply 
the law to the facts of the case and find Clements guilty 
of second degree burglary. The evidence regarding intent 
being sufficient, the determination of the trial court judge 
should not be disturbed. 
POINT II. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-3 (1969 SUPP.) 
IS NOT VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS OR UNCER-
TAIN AND SHOULD BE UPHELD AS CON-
STITUTIONAL. 
There is a "long established presumption in favor of 
the constitutionality of a statute," Ashwander v. Tennes-
see Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 354 (1936). This 
presumption has been relied on by the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah in State v. Nielson, 19 Utah 2d 66, 426 
P. 2d 13 (1967) wherein the court stated: 
"The general rule of statutory construction is 
to hold an enactment of the legislature valid unless 
it clearly appears to violate some provision of the 
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constitution of this State or of the United States." 
Id. at 69. See also Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 
2d 138, 434 P. 2d 449 (1967) and Trade Commis-
sion v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 
446 P. 2d 958 (1968). 
With this presumption in mind the particular statute 
in question should be analyzed. Clements contends that 
the second degree burglary statute became vague and un-
certain, in respect to intent, with the amendment of 1969 
which eliminated the "nighttime" requirement. The re-
quirement of intent to commit larceny or a felony re-
mained the same in the 1969 amendment of the second 
degree burglary statute. Without a specific change in the 
law related to intent the new law must be construed con-
sistent with the prior statute. 
"The provisions of any statute, so far as they 
are the same as those of any prior statute, cshall 
be construed as a continuation of such provisions, 
and ... not as a new enactment." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-6 ( 1953) . 
The only portion of the second degree burglary stat-
ute that was changed was the requirement that the break-
ing and entering must be at night. An amendment which 
eliminates the "nighttime" requirement would help to 
make the statute more certain and eliminate possible am-
biguities as to when it is, or is not, "nighttime." 
The second degree burglary statute should not suffer 
a vagueness attack because a new misdemeanor has been 
created for entering "with intent to damage property or 
to injure a person or annoy the peace and quiet of any 
occupant therein." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-9 (1969 Supp.). 
The plain meaning of the words adequately define a dif-
ferent offense in the case of the misdemeanor than as 
found in the second degree burglary statute. 
The second degree burglary statute, as amended in 
1969, should be construed as constitutional in light of the 
rule that statutes should be construed as constitutional 
whenever possible. (See Ashwander, Nielson, Gord and 
Trade Commission cases, supra.) Clements' vagueness 
attack has been against the intent requirement of the 
statute which has not changed and should receive a statu-
tory construction consistent with prior law. The second 
degree burglary statute is valid and constitutional. 
POINT III. 
CLEMENTS WAS GIVEN A FAIR AND 
SPEEDY TRIAL WITHIN CONSTITUTION-
AL STANDARDS. 
Clements raises several allegations of prejudice or 
unfairness at the trial court. His basic contentions are: 
Clements was tried concurrently with a co-defendant; he 
was tried without a jury; the intoxication defense was not 
raised; counsel had a pecuniary interest in the case; and, 
there was a delay in transmitting the record on appeal. 
These contentions basically question whether or not Clem-
ents received a fair and speedy trial within constitutional 
standards. 
The question of whether or not the two defendants 
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in this burglary offense could be tried together was raised 
in the lower court proceedings. After Judge John F. 
\Vahlquist suggested that the two defendants might be 
tried together, the State filed a proper motion for consoli-
dation (R. 18). On October 5, 1970, before Judge Ronald 
0. Hyde, the cases of the two defendants were consoli-
dated (R. 26). At the actual trial on November 10, 1970, 
Judge Calvin Gould reviewed the consolidation matter 
\vith the attorneys of both defendants (R. 36). At no 
time was the consolidation objected to and Clements 
points to no specific prejudice resulting from the con-
solidation. 
Clements also raises a question regarding his right 
to a jury trial. A look at the record shows that Judge 
Gould seoarately interrogated both defendants regarding 
their waiver of jury trial. In respect to Clements, the 
transcript reveals: 
THE COURT: And you are Earl Ward 
Clemons (sic) ? 
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you understand you have 
a right to a jury trial, Mr. Clemons (sic)? 
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: There would be eight persons 
empaneled and the District Attorney would have 
to convince all eight of them as to your guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt? 
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes. 
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THE COURT: Their verdict would have to 
be unanimous. You have talked to Mr. Adams, 
who is your attorney, about this? 
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Yes your Honor. 
And I felt my own self I would leave it up to the 
descretion of your Honor. 
THE COURT: You would like to waive the 
right and have the Court try the factual issues? 
MR. CLEMONS (sic): Right, your Honor 
(R. 36-37). 
It is clear from the Record that Clements knowingly 
and intelligently waived his right to jury trial Justice 
would not be served by allowing Clements to now com· 
plain of possible trial errors which he participated in cre-
ating. 
Clements' counsel in the trial court did not raise the 
intoxication defense nor did he move for a possible mis-
trial when the judge's decision was announced. A hind-
sight look at the trial outcome and a criticism of trial 
tactics does not provide grounds for reversal. 
Cases hold that the constitutional right to counsel is 
not violated unless an attorney's performance reduces the 
trial to a farce or a sham through lack of competence, dili-
gence or knowledge of the law. In re Beaty, 51 Cal. Rptr. 
521, 64 C. 2d 760, 414 P. 2d 817 (1966). See also Baron 
v. State, 7 Ariz. App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975 (1968) and 
Gresham v. Page, Okla. Cr., 441 P. 2d 478 (1968), cert. 
denied, 393 U. S. 916 (1968). The defendant was granted 
a right to counsel through court appointment and the 
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Record shows that Mr. Adams performed his duties in 
a competent manner. 
The delay in having the Record transmitted to the 
Supreme Court for appeal does not constitute a breach 
of a constitutional right. The Utah Supreme Court has 
said regarding a two-week delay in a trial court proceed-
ing: 
"Under the circumstances here, where no one 
was intentionally prejudiced by the two-week de-
lay. The ends of justice were not aborted .... Un-
reasonable release of felons on technicality, result-
ing in their freedom to continue plying in their 
trade, by superficial resort to strained, technical 
construction of a statute or constitution becomes 
the shield for the miscreant, and the cross of decent 
citizenry which some time could lead to a tea 
party and volley of fire across a bridge." State v. 
Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 203, 418 P. 2d 134, 
135 (1966). See also United States v. Ewell, 383 
u. s. 116 (1966). 
It should be noted that Clements raises the question 
of speedy trial not in connection with the constitutionally 
safeguarded trial court proceedings but with the state 
g-.canted appellate proceedings. 
In a recent Tenth Circuit case the question ·of appel-
late delay as a violation of due process of law was con-
sidered. The court held: 
"Ash's appeal was docketed in the appellat~ 
court on November 6, 1968 and ultimately decider! 
on July 22, 1969, despite the unexplained loss of 
the record on appeal which necessitated its dupli-._. 
C? L·lvn. 
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"We hold that under the circumstances, there 
was no inordinate, excessive or inexcusable delay 
rendering the conviction void, as urged by Ash." 
Ash v. Turner, No. 692-69 (April 6, 1970). 
A similar fact situation has been presented by Clem-
ents. There has been no prejudice shown by the delay 
in transmitting the transcript and there has been no vio-
lation of constitutional rights. 
Clements has alleged that he did not receive a fair 
trial by reciting conclusory statements about how the 
trial might have been improved. The Record shows nfJ 
facts wherein the defendant was specifically prejudiced 
at the trial court level. Mere hindsight as to how a trial 
might have been cannot be the basis for overturning the 
decision of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the evidence brought before the 
trial court clearly showed that Clements had the requisite 
intent to sustain the conviction of second degree burglary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3 (1969 Supp.) is not vague and 
should be construed in a manner consistent with its prede 
cessor and should be upheld as constitutional. Clements 
was granted a fair and speedy trial and the conviction of 
the lower court should therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAURENN.BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
